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Abstract 
 
This theoretical paper includes the shadow economy in the popular AD-AS model and derives 
the main economic results for both the short-run and the long-run. This accounts for the 
presence of the shadow economy in countries around the world, as well its persistence over 
time. Precisely, if the shadow economy is capable of absorbing unemployment, then in the 
short-run there will be a supply-side positive shock on output (the “shadow shock”). The 
“shadow shock” is, however, temporary; in the long-run the effect of the shadow economy on 
potential output is negative. 
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Introduction 
The Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply (hereinafter, AD-AS) model is one of the fun-
damental tools in economics. It is probably the most popular and the most studied at the under-
graduate level, because it allows economists to analyse – in a straightforward graphical repre-
sentation – the effects of economic shocks and economic policies on three key macroeconomic 
variables: growth, inflation, and unemployment. Also, the AD-AS model is a very general and 
flexible framework, since it accommodates both the Keynesian view (that focuses on aggregate 
demand over the short-run) and the Classical approach (that focuses on aggregate supply over 
the long-run). 
However, while the factors which determine economic growth (such as technological pro-
gress and human capital) indirectly appear in the AD-AS model (in determining the potential 
output), another important economic phenomenon, the shadow economy, finds no place in this 
very widespread and well-studied economic model. 
The shadow economy (also known as hidden economy, black economy, underground econ-
omy, and informal economy) refers to all economic activities that are hidden to official author-
ities for various reasons (such as avoiding paying taxes and social security contributions, or 
escaping governmental bureaucracy and regulatory burdens). The shadow economy is, by def-
inition, a phenomenon that is difficult to measure, since it includes different types of activities: 
legal productive activities, illegal and criminal activities, do-it-yourself and household activi-
ties. Furthermore, in macroeconomic estimates, it is often difficult to distinguish between legal 
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and illegal activities.2 This is a very important shortcoming, since only legal activities contrib-
ute (if recorded) to the national wealth, thereby, increasing taxable income. 
 
 
Figure 1. Shadow Economy over time and by Region (average, percent of Gross Domestic Product. Source: Me-
dina and Schneider, 2017) 
Figure 1 reports recent estimates of the shadow economy for 158 Countries over time for 
1991-2015. Two clear results emerge from Figure 1. First, the shadow economy is a widespread 
phenomenon around the world, albeit to varying extents. Second, the shadow economy is a 
phenomenon that persists over time. This topic, therefore, deserves to be included in the most 
popular and most studied macroeconomic model. Indeed, the main aim of this theoretical paper 
is to incorporate the shadow economy into the AD-AS model and to derive the main economic 
results, in both the short-run and the long-run, thus making this popular but “old” framework 
more alive. 
Aggregate Demand with tax evasion 
The AD-AS model aims at explaining one of the most important topics in macroeconomics: 
short-run fluctuations over the so-called business cycle.  These are the deviations of the actual 
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(real) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from its potential or long-run level.3 Mathematically, the 
AD-AS model consists of two functions: Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply. 
The Aggregate Demand function (hereinafter, AD) represents the aggregate expenditure of 
an economic system, namely, the sum of households’ consumption (𝐶), firms’ investment (𝐼) 
and public spending (𝐺):4 
𝐴𝐷 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺                                                                                                         (1) 
The AD is a relationship between changes in a price index P (such as the Consumer Price Index 
or the GDP deflator) and the amount of real GDP when the goods market and the financial 
markets are in equilibrium, namely, when aggregate expenditure is equal to real output (GDP), 
denoted by Y. At a lower price level, the same nominal amount of total spending will purchase 
more real GDP and vice versa. Therefore, the slope of the AD curve must be negative, in the 
tautological sense. 
In order to highlight the key role of the shadow economy in equation (1), as well as the 
strong link between the shadow economy and tax evasion (𝐸), i.e. the illegal non-payment or 
underpayment of tax, a simple government budget constraint is introduced into the AD-AS 
model (in the textbooks, G is treated as an exogenous variable): 
𝐺 = 𝑇                                                                                                                         (2) 
𝑇 = 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝜑) ∙ 𝑌 = 𝑡 ∙ 𝑌 − 𝐸                                                                                 (3) 
𝐸 = 𝑡 ∙ 𝜑 ∙ 𝑌                                                                                                               (4) 
where T is state revenue, 0 < 𝑡 < 1 is the flat tax rate on output Y, and 0 < 𝜑 < 1 is the share 
of the shadow economy in total output. Of course, as highlighted by equation (4), there is a 
positive relation between the shadow economy and tax evasion. As the shadow economy can-
not be taxed, an increase in 𝜑 (and thus in E) reduces state revenues and, consequently, the 
quality and quantity of the supply of public goods and services (Torgler, 2007). Thus, public 
expenditure (G) falls. 
The government budget constraint used in this model is very standard and is identical to that 
of Mazhar and Méon (2017), except for the presence of seigniorage. Mazhar and Méon (2017), 
in fact, assume that a government has two instruments with which to finance a given level of 
public spending: a flat tax on output and seigniorage. This leads to a positive relation between 
the shadow economy and inflation. However, their budget constraint relies on the unrealistic 
possibility that a government can control monetary policy. That is, there is no independent 
central bank. In our case, therefore, the government finances a given level of public spending, 
especially with respect to taxes.5 When 𝜑 increases, 𝑡 should increase to preserve the existing 
level of public spending. Hence, the shadow economy can also increase taxation, thus reducing 
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consumption. Nevertheless, aggregate consumption cannot increase, since the main beneficiar-
ies of tax evasion are the tax evaders themselves (Alm and Finlay, 2013). That is, individuals 
with higher income and ceteris paribus lower marginal propensity to consumption. 
Finally, investment can also decrease in the presence of the shadow economy. This is usually 
associated with corruption, organised crime, government instability, low quality of political 
institutions, and weak rule of law which can discourage investors or lead to a waste of resources 
(through bribes, for example). 
 
Figure 2. The AD with the shadow economy and tax evasion 
In short, all the main determinants of aggregate demand are negatively affected by the 
shadow economy. Hence, the AD with the shadow economy – which we call ADS – is lower 
than the standard AD (see Figure 2), since ceteris paribus and for a given price index (𝑃 = 𝑃0), 
the aggregate expenditure of an economy with (a larger share of) the shadow economy is lower. 
 
Aggregate Supply with Shadow Employment 
The Aggregate Supply function (hereinafter, AS) shows the quantity of goods and services 
supplied by an economy when there is equilibrium in the labour market. A simple equation is 
often used to describe the aggregate supply function: 
𝐴𝑆 = 𝑌𝑝 + 𝛽 ∙ (𝑃 − 𝑃
𝐸)                                                                                             (5) 
where 𝛽 is a positive parameter (𝛽 > 0), 𝑌𝑝 is the level of potential GDP, and 𝑃
𝐸  is price ex-
pectations. In the short-run, when price expectations are not correct (𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐸), the AS is upward 
sloping in the P-Y space, meaning that when aggregate demand changes, firms adjust both price 
and quantity. For example, when aggregate demand increases, firms increase both price and 
quantity.  In the long run, when price expectations are correct (𝑃 = 𝑃𝐸), the Aggregate Supply 
function is a vertical straight line at 𝑌 = 𝑌𝑝, the quantity of goods and services supplied by an 
economy coincides with the level of potential GDP. 
In the long-run, economic theory agrees that the actual (real) GDP always coincides with 
the potential output of the economy (𝑌 = 𝑌𝑝). Hence, economic policy has no real effects and 
an increase in aggregate demand only increases prices. In the short-run, however, there is a 
potential active role for economic policy: both government and the central bank can increase 
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the actual level of GDP (by means of expansive economic policies that move the aggregate 
demand curve to the right) at the cost of higher inflation (an increase in the percentage change 
in the price index P). 
In the AD-AS model, by definition, a higher level of potential GDP implies a lower natural 
unemployment rate. This is consistent with the empirical finding that (at least in advanced 
countries) productivity growth is strongly negatively correlated with unemployment in the 
long-run (see Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007). 
In the shadow economy, firms employ mostly unskilled labour and adopt backward tech-
nology (see, e.g., Albrecht et al., 2009; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Indeed, the shadow sector 
is very large in the poorest economies (see La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Economic growth is, 
in fact, an essential element in reducing the shadow sector, although in some cases informality 
can persist, in spite of economic growth (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita and informal employment (Source: ILO 2011) 
Finally, the general finding of growth theory is that economic growth requires improve-
ments in social infrastructure, a key component of which is government fiscal policy (Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Romer, 2006).6 Thus, an economy with more tax evasion and a shadow economy 
is merely a society with poor social infrastructure. 
Therefore, long-run growth and, thus, potential output should be higher in an economy with-
out (or with a lower share of) a shadow economy, namely 𝑌𝑝 > 𝑌𝑝
𝑆, where 𝑌𝑝
𝑆 denote the po-
tential GDP of a society with (a larger share of) the shadow economy. 
                                                          
6   According to the popular definition by Hall and Jones (1999), social infrastructures are “institutions and 
policies that align private and social returns.” In short, this would correctly or otherwise infer that in countries 
with good social infrastructure, negative phenomena (such as corruption and crime) are uncommon. 
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For the sake of simplicity, assume that the slope of the short-run AS curve (namely, the 𝛽 
parameter) does not change for a society with a shadow economy. Thus, the long-run equilib-
rium of the AD-AS model with a shadow economy can be portrayed as in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. The AD-AS model with the shadow economy in the long-run 
In Figure 4, point A (the intersection of AD and AS) characterises the long-run equilibrium 
of the standard version of the model; whereas, point B (the intersection of ADS and AS) char-
acterises the long-run equilibrium of the model with the shadow economy. By definition, in 
fact, the long-run equilibrium requires that actual GDP coincide with potential GDP. 
As previously stated, in the long-run the shadow economy has negative effects on potential 
GDP. In spite of that, the presence (in countries around the world) and the persistence (over 
time) of the shadow economy should involve the existence of (potential) positive effects on 
output, at least in the short-run. 
It is noteworthy that unemployment may be absorbed by shadow employment (see, e.g. 
Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2005; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Shadow employment (or un-
declared work) refers to the use of labour without an official work contract. Note that, regis-
tered (official) firms can also make use of shadow employment. Firms that operate simultane-
ously both in the regular and in the shadow economy (by using undeclared work) are termed 
“moonlighting firms” (Busato et al., 2005; Ciccarone et al., 2012). In this context, if firms (for 
fiscal and economic reasons) increase the use of undeclared work and, thus, shadow employ-
ment is capable of absorbing unemployment, there could be a positive effect on both employ-
ment and output, thereby engendering a kind of supply-side positive shock, or “shadow 
shock”.  If this happens, the short-run AS curve in the presence of the shadow economy moves 
downward in the P-Y space and, thus, 𝑌 > 𝑌𝑝
𝑆 . Considering equation (5), therefore, the 
“shadow shock” is associated with a decrease in 𝑃𝐸 . By using shadow employment, indeed, 
firms expect to reduce their labor cost. 
This completes the extension of the AD-AS model. Now, the main economic results are 
derived for both the short-run and the long-run. 
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The AD-AS Model with or without the Shadow Economy: A Comparison 
We compare two equilibria that only differ with respect to the share of the shadow economy, 
since the comparative statics of the model (the effect of changes in exogenous variables) do 
not change with respect to the standard version of the AD-AS model. 
 
Figure 5. The AD-AS model with and without the shadow economy: short-run and long-run 
For the sake of comparison, there are no other economic shocks aside from the shadow 
economy. Thus, in an economy without a shadow economy (𝜑 = 0), the long-run equilibrium 
coincides with the short-run equilibrium (point A in Figure 5). 
As mentioned above, in an economy with tax evasion and shadow employment (0 < 𝜑 <
1) there could be a positive economic shock on the supply side (the “shadow shock”). This 
“shadow shock” is, by definition, temporary, since there is no change in the potential level of 
GDP. Thus, point C in Figure 5 identifies the short-run equilibrium of the AD-AS model with 
the shadow economy (the short-run AS curve in the presence of the shadow economy – the 
dotted line in Figure 5 – moves downward). 
In the short-run, therefore, in the presence of tax evasion and shadow employment (point C 
in Figure 5), the effect on output is positive. Of course, the size of this positive effect on output 
depends on the changes in both the ADS and the AS. Precisely, if the positive effect of shadow 
employment on the actual level of GDP is significant (AS falls considerably in the presence of 
the shadow economy),7 then point C could potentially be a better situation than point A, since 
the cost of living is lower and purchasing power is higher. 
Instead, in the long-run (compare points A and B in Figures 4 and 5), as suggested by em-
pirical evidence (see, e.g. La Porta and Shleifer, 2008), in the presence of the shadow economy, 
the potential output is lower, since unproductive shadow firms use unskilled labour and adopt 
backward technology. 
Therefore, an intertemporal socioeconomic dilemma emerges for policymakers: 
(1) If the main goal of policymakers is economic growth, they should devote their greatest 
efforts to fighting against the shadow economy (tax evasion and corruption, first of all). Also, 
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policymakers should adopt other economic policies that are compatible with this purpose, such 
as reducing both the tax burden and inefficient public expenditure, improving governance and 
the quality of political institutions, and strengthening the rule of law. Finally, policymakers 
should devote more economic resources to investing in both human capital and research and 
development. Of course, the achievement of these goals would require a lot of effort and a very 
long time. 
(2) Instead, if the policymakers look especially at the present, the shadow economy could 
be tolerated to some extent. In some countries, this seems to happen. In the short-run, in fact, 
shadow employment could increase both employment and output. 
This simple extension of the AD-AS model is capable of explaining the presence of the 
shadow economy in countries around the world, as well its persistence over time. 
 
Conclusion 
Empirically, the shadow economy is a widespread phenomenon around the world that per-
sists over time. Thus, the effects of a shadow economy deserve study at the basic level of in-
troductory courses in economics. More precisely, the benefit of including the shadow economy 
in one of the most studied macroeconomic models at the undergraduate level, the AD-AS 
model, is twofold. From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of tax evasion and shadow 
employment in the AD-AS model is straightforward, but the results are non-trivial. From an 
economic point of view, this paper makes this popular but “old” framework more alive. This 
simple extension of the AD-AS model is able to account for the presence and persistence of 
the shadow economy, despite its negative effects on economic growth. 
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